Political narratives in the spirit of Russian propaganda | Mieroszewski Centre

The Mieroszewski Centre publishes the report “Political narratives in the spirit of Russian propaganda. A report on their presence in Polish academic literature, 2014–2024” by Dr. Ernest Wyciszkiewicz and Dr. Bartłomiej Gajos. It is the first study in Poland to analyse the presence of narratives aligned with Russian messaging in academic literature in the fields of humanities and social sciences.

The report was developed in response to the growing importance of Russia’s information warfare — conducted not only through media and politics but also within research, interpretation, and language itself. The authors’ goal was to assess the scale of pro-Russian narratives appearing in Polish academic discourse and to determine the context in which they occur: whether they are being criticised, merely reported, or — though rarely — endorsed.

The study demonstrates that the language of science, like any other discourse, is not immune to interpretive influence and may — even unintentionally — reinforce narratives originating from the sphere of propaganda.

How often does academia carry Russian stories?

The report provides measurable answers. The research team analysed a corpus of Polish academic publications from 2014–2024 drawn from bibliotekanauki.pl — the largest open-access repository of humanities and social science texts in Poland.

A confirmatory method and data science tools were used. Based on the academic literature, Russian elite messaging, and Vladimir Putin’s speeches, the authors defined 44 key pro-Kremlin narratives. These were then identified across 377 publications, marking a total of 1,970 fragments.

The identified narratives serve four main functions in Russian information policy:

• delegitimising Ukraine – undermining its statehood, national identity, and capacity for independent action;
• legitimising Russia’s actions – portraying aggression as defence, reaction, or “historical necessity”;
• discrediting the West – accusing Western states of provoking conflict, hypocrisy, and seeking to destroy Russia;
• demobilising Polish society – reinforcing passivity, discouragement, and the belief that “this is not our war.”

This structure reveals that pro-Russian narratives do not function in isolation — they form a coherent system designed to simultaneously undermine Ukraine’s credibility, legitimise the Kremlin’s actions, and weaken the information resilience of both the West and Poland.

What do the data show?

The core of the identified narratives is the delegitimisation of Ukraine. The most frequent themes include:

• “A divided Ukraine” – 200 publications,
• “A corrupt Ukraine” – 126,
• “Ukraine as a failed state” – 105,
• “Ukraine as a puppet of the West” – 99.

Further down the list appear narratives legitimising Russia’s actions (“protection of Russian-speaking populations,” “inevitability of war,” justifications for the annexation of Crimea), followed by those discrediting the West (“The West provoked the war”) or demobilising Polish society (“This is not our war”).

Co-occurrence analysis shows that the motif of a “divided Ukraine” acts as a hub — reinforcing other messages that question Ukraine’s statehood and its right to sovereignty.

Sounds alarming? There is good news too

Most publications adopt critical or descriptive approaches. Affirmation of Russian narratives occurs only incidentally. Sentiment analysis (with due caution given the neutral tone typical of academic writing) indicates a moderate emotional tone. The peaks in the presence of such narratives correspond to 2014 (the first aggression against Ukraine) and 2022 (the full-scale invasion), which aligns with the political calendar — with a delay typical of academic publishing cycles.

The paradox: informing about disinformation without amplifying it

The report highlights a paradox faced by both academia and the media: every mention of a propaganda message — even to refute it — increases its reach and recognisability.

Therefore, the authors recommend a set of practices to maintain balance between accurate analysis and unintentional amplification of Kremlin messaging:

• informed commentary instead of “bare quotation” – with a clear indication of purpose (“for falsification,” “for comparison”);
• strategic silence – limiting exposure to planned disinformation operations;
• pre-debunking – alerting audiences to expected disinformation campaigns (e.g., around anniversaries or key events);
• precise language and terminology guidelines – “annexation” instead of “reunification,” “invasion/aggression” instead of “special operation”;
• enhanced editorial and methodological competence – training for scholars and academic editors in citation handling, narrative analysis, and source assessment.

What the report does not do

The authors do not pass judgment on scholars’ intentions.
The presence of a narrative ≠ its affirmation.
The goal is not evaluation but analysis — to understand the scale of the phenomenon. The report acknowledges the representativeness limitations of the bibliotekanauki.pl corpus and stresses that its findings apply to the examined sample, not to the entirety of Polish academic output.

Why it matters

Information warfare is waged not only in the media but also in academia — through language, definitions, and interpretations. Research shows that even neutral or academic repetition of Russian concepts may gradually normalise them in public debate and strengthen their legitimacy.

The Mieroszewski Centre’s report is meant to serve as a starting point for a broader discussion on linguistic responsibility in science and on ways to strengthen the information resilience of the academic community without restricting academic freedom.

Recommendation: towards a culture of responsible communication

The authors propose the creation of an inter-institutional working group — involving scholars and academic editors — to develop a code of good practices. The aim is to establish a standard that:

• does not impose censorship,
• raises awareness of communication risks,
• helps to consciously formulate messages on propaganda-sensitive topics.

Why this report?

To involve the academic community in building information resilience — without censorship, but with greater linguistic awareness and responsibility. It is the first large-scale mapping of pro-Russian narratives in Polish academic discourse and a starting point for ongoing monitoring of how such narratives influence both academic and public debate.