

POLAND AND POLES










Warsaw 2024

Report of the Mieroszewski Centre
on public opinion research conducted in Ukraine

AS SEEN BY UKRAINIANS 2024







POLAND AND POLES AS SEEN BY UKRAINIANS 2024

Report of the Mieroszewski Centre
on public opinion research conducted in Ukraine

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Publisher

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1. Introduction

This report presents the results of a public opinion survey conducted in Ukraine on attitudes towards Poland and Poles. The study was commissioned by the Mioszowski Centre and carried out in the first half of November 2024 by the Info Sapiens sociological research centre. Some of the questions had already been asked to Ukrainian respondents in earlier surveys conducted by the same research provider for the Mioszowski Centre: in August 2022 and October 2023. As a result, we can trace whether or not any significant changes have occurred in the perception of Poland over time and, if so, to identify their nature.

In particular, what deserves a close analysis are the responses to questions related to the issues in Polish-Ukrainian relations that have been widely covered by the media in both countries. One such issue was the blockage of the Polish-Ukrainian border by farmers' associations and representatives of the transport industry protesting against the unequal competition conditions. The resulting regular disruptions to freight traffic at border crossings with Ukraine in the winter of 2022/2023, coupled with incidents involving such protesters dumping grain led to a significant decrease — by 22.5 percentage points — in Poland's positive ratings at that time. Did the end of the protests in the spring of 2024 improve the attitudes prevalent in Ukrainian public opinion towards Poland and Poles, or did it have no impact?

Another issue we sought to explore in our study was Ukrainians' awareness that relations with Poland are significantly burdened by historical memory of both nations and issues related to the search, exhumation and burial of Polish victims of wars and repressions buried on Ukrainian territory, especially victims of the Volhynia Massacre. Since 2017, the Ukrainian authorities have effectively blocked the granting of permits to Polish institutions to carry out these works. The moratorium, initiated in 2017 by the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, was a reaction to acts of vandalism carried out by 'unknown perpetrators' against certain commemorations in burial sites of members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

(UPA) in eastern Poland, most of which had been erected without the legally required permits. This issue had already weighed heavily on bilateral relations even before 24 February 2022. The persistence of the blockade during wartime has provoked considerable outrage among the Polish public, leading government representatives to comment that the failure to resolve the problem might be seen by Poland as Ukraine's inability to meet minimal standards of the rule of law and, consequently, its inability to respect the values essential for a positive assessment of Ukraine's application for European Union membership.

Our study also included some new questions. For example, we sought to verify a claim advocated by many Polish commentators, namely that Ukrainians have forgotten the assistance Poland provided to Ukraine in its defence against the genocidal aggression of the Russian Federation.

While I encourage everyone to delve into the survey results and the accompanying analysis by Info Sapiens, I would like to share several conclusions from the analysis of the survey findings. Some of these are further substantiated by an analysis of detailed unpublished data on respondents' age, education or place of residence for each question asked.

First and foremost, it is evident that the effects of the border blockage and incidents such as grain dumping—typically reported in Ukrainian media without reference to the protesters' perspectives or Poland's cultural context—have proved to be long-lasting. Pro-Polish attitudes in Ukraine are significantly less prevalent now in comparison with 2022 and 2023. In November 2024, respondents expressed views on Poland and Poles similar to those recorded in January of the same year, with a slight decrease in the level of dislike, presumably due to the absence of media discourse on the border blockage. This, however, did not translate into increased liking. In fact, the latter has even slightly decreased. Currently, 41% of Ukrainians hold a positive view of Poles. For comparison, in January 2024, a total of 45% of Ukrainians expressed a favourable opinion of Poles, while 9% held an unfavourable opinion.

In October 2023, a total of 67% of Ukrainians stated a positive opinion of Poles, with 19% expressing a very positive opinion. In 2022, the figures stood at 83% for positive views and 1.5% for unfavorable views.

The negative trend in terms of liking towards Poles is also evident when comparing responses to the question about the change of respondents' attitudes towards Poles after the outbreak of the full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine. Currently, 26% of Ukrainians claim their opinion of Poles changed for the better after 24 February 2022, while 16% say it changed for the worse. The greatest disappointment was expressed by Kyiv residents (22%) while those living in eastern Ukraine are least disappointed (9%). By comparison, in January 2024, the percentage of Ukrainians who said their opinion of Poles had improved amounted to 30%, whereas 13% gave the opposite answer. In October 2023, a total of 39% of Ukrainians declared that their opinion of Poles had improved after the outbreak of the war, while 3% said that it had worsened. There is a clear correlation with education levels. Individuals with tertiary education were least likely to change their opinion of Poles for the worse (13%) in comparison with those with primary education (21%).

At the same time, Ukrainians still appreciate Poland's role in providing military aid to Ukraine, which is an important finding countering popular opinions prevalent in Poland. When asked which large European country is helping Ukraine the most, 23% of respondents named Poland, placing it third in the ranking of nations perceived as most supportive of Ukraine, behind the United Kingdom (34% of responses) and Germany (29%). In rural areas and small towns, the difference between Germany and Poland is minimal, while in larger cities with populations over 100,000, the difference reaches approx. 12 percentage points. Geographically, respondents from areas with weaker ties with Poland seem to favour Germany in their responses. In the east of Ukraine, the gap between the two countries amounts to 17 percentage points, while in the west reaching just 2.5 points in Poland's favour. When it comes to respondents' age, Poland narrowly edged out Germany only among old age pensioners (aged over 65). At the same time, the results for Germany, irrespective of the country's actual contribution to the assistance to Ukraine, provide material for reflection on how to conduct effective public diplomacy.

Over the first ten months of 2024, the level of distrust towards Poland slightly increased. While 76% of respondents believe that Poland will support Ukraine on its path

to EU membership, this figure is down by 10 percentage points compared to the survey conducted a year ago. Also, the level of confidence that Poland will continue to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia is lower than a year ago: while 91% of Ukrainians expressed such a belief last year, it has now dropped to 85%.

A systematic increase is also noticeable in the percentage of Ukrainians who, when asked directly, suggest that Poland supports Ukraine because Poles consider part of Ukrainian lands as their own. In 2022, this was the view of 6% of respondents, while this share rose to 11% in 2023 and has reached 20% in this most recent survey. If these answers are contrasted with the 30% of respondents who declare that Poland's revisionist plans towards Ukraine may have truth to them, and the 4% who believe that these rumours are true, it becomes evident that a minority group of Ukrainians, which is nevertheless noticeable, is susceptible to anti-Polish disinformation, propagated primarily in the interests of the Russian Federation.

Poles, on the other hand, are still perceived by Ukrainians as the country which is culturally closest to them: this view has reached 46% (compared to 9% for Belarusians, 6% for Moldovans, 5% for Slovaks, and 4% for Russians), with 55% indicating Poles as the culturally closest nation in western Ukraine and 38% in eastern Ukraine. More people in rural areas (55%) than in cities exceeding 100,000 inhabitants (42%) indicated Poland. A higher proportion of such responses than in the other regions (43%) was also recorded in Right-Bank Ukraine (51%), including Kyiv, but excluding Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia regions.

It is worth noting that Poland as Ukraine's culturally closest neighbour was indicated more often by people with primary education (60%) than secondary education (49%), incomplete tertiary education (40%) and tertiary education (43%). The conclusion about a greater liking for Poland among the 'common people' rather than the elites is also apparent from the analysis of detailed answers to the question about the country which provides most support to Ukraine: respondents with tertiary education (20%) were less likely to choose Poland than those with secondary and primary education (26%). The same trend emerged in the case of answers to the question on attitudes towards Poland: 6% of respondents with tertiary education stated a negative opinion of Poland, compared to only 2% among those with primary education. Interestingly, the view that Poland's actions are guided by revisionist motives was also significantly more common

among respondents with tertiary education (24%), compared with those with primary education (16%).

All these findings lead to a hypothesis that—in contrast to the situation in Poland, where the most pro-Ukrainian attitudes are held by people with tertiary education—Ukraine exhibits an opposite pattern. The elites tend to maintain a slightly greater distance from Poland than other social strata and are generally less trustful. However, further research is required to verify this hypothesis and identify the reasons behind this phenomenon. One possible explanation is that people with tertiary education are more familiar with the anti-Polish stereotypes present in Ukrainian culture, promoted for various reasons since the 19th century by both the Russian authorities and the local Ukrainian nationalist movement.

Against the background of these negative trends, some positive phenomena should also be noted. Nearly half of Ukrainian respondents, i.e. 48%, would like to see a permanent alliance or even a confederation with Poland, rather than merely good neighbourly relations. This compares to 45% in 2023 and 58% in 2022. One-third of Ukrainians are in favour of the immediate lifting of the Ukrainian ban on exhumation permits for Polish institutions, and an additional 40% are in favour of allowing exhumations as soon as Poland fulfils its promise to reconstruct the plaque on the grave of UPA activists on Mount Monastyrz. Only 6%


of Ukrainians do not want Polish institutions to be allowed to search for and bury the remains of Poles killed or murdered on Ukrainian territory.

Moreover, 23% of Ukrainians claim to have heard a lot about the Volhynia Massacre (30% among those with tertiary education), and 58% have heard something about it but are uncertain of their knowledge. Most respondents who are 'certain' of their knowledge (27%) live in the west of the country, with 36% in Galicia alone. By comparison, in 2023, a total of 21% of Ukrainians felt they knew a lot about the topic, with 15% in 2022. Two years ago, 14% of Ukrainians agreed that UPA units were responsible for the murders, acting either under orders from the commanders or on their own. The percentage of such answers already reached 18% in 2023 and 2024.

I invite readers to analyse the responses to other questions from our survey on their own and reflect on whether the decreasing prevalence of attitudes favourable towards Poland and Poles, as well as the declining sense of emotional closeness among Ukrainians, is a phenomenon that Poland can afford to see as neutral and quite expected, or whether it should be seen as an alarming signal.

Łukasz Adamski, PhD

Deputy Director of the Mioszowski Centre



2. Information about the study

Methodology



Over nearly three years since the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Info Sapiens has conducted three major surveys for the Mieroszewski Centre on Ukrainians' attitudes towards Poland and Poles. In all three cases, the nationally representative sample covered approximately 1,000 respondents, with a maximum theoretical margin of error of 3.1%. The surveys were conducted on 11–15 August 2022, 9–19 October 2023 and 1–11 November 2024.

All surveys were conducted using the CATI method (computer-assisted telephone interviewing) based on a random sample of mobile phone numbers. The sample structure reflects the structure of the adult population of territories controlled by the Ukrainian government in terms of gender, age, size of domicile and region of residence prior to the full-scale Russian invasion, according to data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine as of 1 January 2022. The survey was not conducted in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Sevastopol or other Ukrainian


territories temporarily occupied by Russia, where Ukrainian mobile network operators do not provide services. Also, the survey excluded Ukrainians who had relocated abroad.

For the purposes of this study, regions historically linked to Poland were identified and designated as Galicia and Right-Bank Ukraine (in this study, the latter term refers to the regions of Ukraine located on the right bank of the Dnieper River, namely the city of Kyiv, and the regions of: Kyiv, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Volhynia, Rivne, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Kirovohrad, excluding the three Galician regions of Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil, as well as the Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia regions, which were never part of historical Poland).


Note that the data on some of the graphs do not add up to 100% for multiple choice questions. With single-code questions there are small deviations from 100% when percentage values are rounded off.

Structure of the survey sample


Gender




Age




Education




Region








Size of domicile





Links with Poland



As a result of Ukrainians fleeing the full-scale war and Poland's support for Ukraine, ties between the two countries have deepened. In August 2022, a total of **35%** of Ukrainians

reported having visited Poland, and the figure rose to **40%** by November 2024.

↓ QUESTION:

Have you ever been to Poland?

2024



2023



2022



Yes, I even lived there for a while

Yes, I have been there once or a couple of times

Yes, I have been there many times

No, never

Naturally, the frequency of travel to Poland depends on geographical proximity: a total of **68%** of Galicia residents, **46%** of residents of Right-Bank Ukraine and **31%** of residents of other regions have been to Poland. Moreover,

residents of Galicia and Right-Bank Ukraine were less severely affected by the war and therefore return to Ukraine more often than residents of other regions.

↓ QUESTION:


Have you ever been to Poland?

Breakdown by region.

Total



Galicia



Right-Bank Ukraine



Other regions



Yes, I even lived there for a while

Yes, I have been there once or a couple of times

Yes, I have been there many times

No, never

In **27%** of Ukrainian families there are people who travelled to Poland after the start of the full-scale war.

↓ QUESTION:

Are there any people in your family who left for Poland after 24 February 2022?

2024



2023



2022




- Yes, I left myself
- No, no one from my family left
- No, I did not leave, but my relatives did
- Not sure, can't remember

In Galicia, members of **39%** of families left for Poland after the outbreak of the full-scale war, with **28%** in Right-Bank Ukraine and **24%** in other regions.

↓ QUESTION:

Are there any people in your family who left for Poland after 24 February 2022? Breakdown by region.

Total



Galicia



Right-Bank Ukraine



Other regions



■ Yes, I left myself

■ No, no one from my family left

■ No, I did not leave, but my relatives did

■ Not sure, can't remember


The Polish language is known, or at least somewhat understood, by **53%** of Ukrainians, with another **2%** claiming to be fluent in it. Interestingly, the percentage of people declaring some command of Polish has slightly decreased

since 2022. This is probably because those most proficient in Polish were more likely to stay in Poland or other countries.

↓ QUESTION:

Do you speak Polish?

2024



2023



2022



■ Yes, I do. I can read and speak Polish fluently

■ I know some Polish. I can read simple texts and communicate with Polish people on simple topics

■ No, I don't, but I can understand it a little because it is a Slavic language

■ No, I do not speak it at all

Overall, **77%** of people living in Galicia understand Polish, compared to **59%** in Right-Bank Ukraine, and **47%** in other regions. However, some individuals may have never been

exposed to the Polish language and, consequently, might not realise that it is partly comprehensible to Ukrainians.

↓ QUESTION:

Do you speak Polish? Breakdown by region.


Total



Galicia



Right-Bank Ukraine



Other regions



■ Yes, I do. I can read and speak Polish fluently




■ I know some Polish. I can read simple texts and communicate with Polish people on simple topics

■ No, I don't, but I can understand it a little because it is a Slavic language

■ No, I do not speak it at all




Attitudes towards Poland and Poles



Which of these countries do you think helped Ukraine the most in military and humanitarian terms during the war?

Poland

27%
23%




When asked about the European countries that help Ukraine the most, a relative majority of respondents mentioned the United Kingdom (34%) and Germany (29%), followed by 23% for Poland. As recently as in October 2023,

Poland was the most frequently mentioned country in this context, which suggests that the grain crisis and political disputes have diminished the perceived scale of Polish assistance among Ukrainians.

↓ QUESTION:


Which of these countries do you think helped Ukraine the most in military and humanitarian terms during the war?



At the same time, after the outbreak of the full-scale war, Poles continue to be perceived as the closest nation to Ukraine (until 2022, this status was held by Belarusians).

↓ QUESTION:

Which neighbouring nation do you consider to be particularly close to the Ukrainians in terms of culture?




Further **35%** of associations do not have a clear emotional tonality: a place to earn money (**10%**), historical events (**8%** – Poland before partitions, the Volhynia Massacre, the Cossack wars), material culture (**7%** – Warsaw and Krakow were mentioned most commonly), immaterial culture (**7%** – language and some words were mentioned most often, including 'Matka Boska' – Mother of God, but also 'kurwa' – a swear word).

Finally, **17%** of the reported associations are negative: **12%** of respondents mentioned negative characteristics (cunning, arrogant, insincere, not supportive of Ukraine) while **5%** referred to the grain crisis. The relatively infrequent mentions of the grain crisis indicate that Ukrainians perceive this conflict as temporary and context-specific.

↓ QUESTION:


What kind of things spontaneously come to mind when you think of Poland?




Which neighbouring nation do you consider to be particularly close to the Ukrainians in terms of culture?

Poles

46%






Due to political and economic disputes, the percentage of Ukrainians whose opinion of Poles has improved since the outbreak of the full-scale war has fallen from **73%** to **25%**, while the share of those whose opinion has worsened has risen from **1%** to **16%**.

↓ QUESTION:

Did your opinion about Poles change after 24 February 2022?


2024



2023



2022



Interestingly, the opinions about Poles after the outbreak of the full-scale war has improved most significantly among Galicia residents (33%), despite the fact that they are more affected than any other region by the


border blockages or interpretations of historical events. This likely results from the fact that Galicians have travelled to Poland more frequently and experienced support from Poles firsthand.

↓ QUESTION:

Did your opinion about Poles change after 24 February 2022?

Breakdown by region.


Total





Galicia



Right-Bank Ukraine



Other regions



Notably, while the percentage of Ukrainians with positive attitudes towards Poles was as high as **83%** in 2022, this figure dropped to **41%** in 2024, with a relative majority of

respondents now maintaining a neutral stance towards Poles. At the same time, negative attitudes remain infrequent, at just **5%**.

↓ QUESTION:

What is your opinion about Poles now?

2024



2023



2022



Residents of Right-Bank Ukraine display the most positive attitudes towards Poles, presumably because they are most knowledgeable of Poland's support for Ukraine,

while seeing fewer contentious issues in comparison with Galicians.

↓ QUESTION:

What is your opinion about Poles now?

Breakdown by region.


Total





Galicia



Right-Bank Ukraine



Other regions




The results of the survey also demonstrate that Ukrainians' attitudes have become more pragmatic: fewer respondents describe Poles as brothers/sisters, friends or

allies, and more see them neutrally as neighbours (54% in 2022 versus 70% in 2024).

↓ QUESTION:

Which of the phrases listed below best describes your attitude towards Poles?




When summing up the positive phrases, it becomes clear that residents of Right-Bank Ukraine and other regions

have scored higher than Galicians, probably due to a lower awareness of disputes among the former two groups.

↓ QUESTION:

Which of the phrases listed below best describes your attitude towards Poles? Breakdown by region.



Despite periodic crises in relations between the two countries, Ukrainians are convinced that Polish support is steadfast. Indeed, **76%** of respondents strongly agree or tend to agree that Poland will continue to support Ukraine on its path to EU integration (**86%** in 2023), and **86%** are certain or fairly certain that Poland will continue to support

Ukrainians in their fight against Russian aggression (compared to **91%** in 2023). Interestingly, Galicians are more confident about Poland's support than other respondents—despite a slightly less positive attitude towards the Poles—possibly because they recognise shared interests of the two nations.

↓ QUESTION:

Do you think Poland is going to continue supporting Ukraine on its way to EU integration?

2024



2023



Yes, absolutely

No, probably not

Not sure

Yes, probably

No, definitely not

↓ QUESTION:

Do you think Poland is going to continue supporting Ukraine on its way to EU integration? Breakdown by region.


Total




Galicia



Right-Bank Ukraine



Other regions



Yes, absolutely

No, probably not

Not sure

Yes, probably

No, definitely not

↓ QUESTION:

Do you think Poland is going to continue supporting Ukraine in its fight against the Russian aggressor?

2024



2023



Yes, absolutely

No, probably not

Not sure

Yes, probably

No, definitely not

↓ QUESTION:

Do you think Poland is going to continue supporting Ukraine in its fight against the Russian aggressor? Breakdown by region.

Total




Galicia



Right-Bank Ukraine



Other regions



Nearly half of Ukrainians believe that future relations between Ukraine and Poland should be developed as good-neighbourly relations [49% vs. 40% in 2022]. The percentage of supporters of an alliance between the two

countries has risen from 24% in 2023 to 27% at present. The lowest share of respondents favour the idea of a confederation [22%].

↓ QUESTION:

In your view, what should the relations between Ukraine and Poland look like in future?


- As good neighbours. Both countries should be friendly to each other, border crossing should be easier, but there is no need for foreign policy consultations.



- As an alliance of two countries. The two countries should support each other and consult their foreign policy with each other. Border crossing should be improved to eliminate the queues.



- As a commonwealth of two countries. The two countries should agree on foreign policy between them, the border between them should be purely symbolic, and people should be able to move and work freely in both countries.



- Not sure




Despite their less enthusiastic attitude towards Poles, Galicians are more likely than residents of other regions to favour an alliance or confederation with Poland, clearly as

a result of geographical proximity and the memory of the shared past.


↓ QUESTION:

In your view, what should the relations between Ukraine and Poland look like in future? Breakdown by region.

- As good neighbours. Both countries should be friendly to each other, border crossing should be easier, but there is no need for foreign policy consultations.



- As an alliance of two countries. The two countries should support each other and consult their foreign policy with each other. Border crossing should be improved to eliminate the queues.



- As a commonwealth of two countries. The two countries should agree on foreign policy between them, the border between them should be purely symbolic, and people should be able to move and work freely in both countries.




- Not sure



In your view, what should the relations between Ukraine and Poland look like in future?

48%

of Ukrainians want a Polish-Ukrainian alliance or confederation




In response to an open-ended question about significant disputes in current Polish-Ukrainian relations, half of Ukrainians confirm the existence of such disputes: **26%** mentioned the grain crisis as such a problem (with another **3%** framing the problem more broadly as 'economic disagreements'), **19%** pointed to the Volhynia Massacre,

6% referred to other historical disputes, **4%** talked about negative attitudes towards Ukrainians and **3%** indicated political disputes. Obviously, Galicians demonstrate the highest awareness of the disputes while residents of regions less closely tied to Poland are least aware of such disputes.

↓ QUESTION:

Do you see any important disputes in Ukrainian-Polish relations?

- No, I don't




- Border blockade, grain crisis




- Volhynia Massacre




- Historical disputes (Stepan Bandera, territorial disputes)




- Negative attitudes towards Ukrainians and Ukrainian refugees




- Economic issues (similar markets, competition, especially in the agricultural sector, etc.)



- Political issues (politicians' attitudes towards one another, blocking Ukraine's accession to the EU, etc.)



- Russia's influence



- Insufficient support for Ukraine during the war



- Other answers



- Not sure




On the one hand, awareness of common interests is higher in 2024 (understanding that Poles help Ukraine because of the Russian threat has risen from 63% in 2023 to 72%, and recognition of Poland's appreciation of good-neighbourly relations has gone up from 28% to 31% at present).

On the other hand, the impact of historical disputes on the perception of Poles among Ukrainians has grown stronger (importantly, the share of respondents supporting the view that Poland considers parts of Ukrainian territory as its own has gone up from 11% to 20%).

↓ QUESTION:

In your opinion, why are Poles helping Ukraine?




The belief that Poles consider parts of Ukrainian territory as their own is most often expressed by respondents from Galicia.

↓ QUESTION:

In your opinion, why are Poles helping Ukraine?


Breakdown by region.



Overall, one-third of Ukrainians consider it possible that Poland might have aggressive plans towards Ukraine, with residents of Galicia being most likely to hold this view [38%].

↓ QUESTION:

Information can be found on the Internet about Poland's aggressive plans towards Ukraine, its desire to occupy western Ukraine and turn it into a Polish protectorate. To what extent do you think this information is true?
Breakdown by region.





5

Attitudes towards selected aspects of Polish-Ukrainian relations


Almost a quarter of Ukrainians (23%) claim to be well acquainted with the Volhynia Massacre as a tragic chapter in history. An additional 58% declare that they have at least heard of it. Awareness of the importance of this issue is

growing, potentially due to the escalation of Polish-Ukrainian disputes or the growing interest in Ukraine's history prompted by the full-scale war.


↓ QUESTION:

Have you heard of the World War II events known to historians as the 'Volhynian Tragedy' or the 'Volhynia Massacre'?


2024



2023



2022




- Yes, I know this topic very well
- Yes, I have heard something, but I am not sure
- No
- Not sure

Have you heard of the World War II events known to historians as the 'Volhynian Tragedy' or the 'Volhynia Massacre'?

Yes, I know this topic very well

27%
20%




Quite naturally, in comparison with other regions, residents of Galicia are more aware of these events and their role in mutual relations between the two countries.

↓ QUESTION:

*Have you heard of the World War II events known to historians as the 'Volhynian Tragedy' or the 'Volhynia Massacre'?
Breakdown by region.*


Total




Galicia



Right-Bank Ukraine



Other regions



Yes, I know this topic very well

Yes, I have heard something, but I am not sure

No

Not sure

Much as in the previous year, a relative majority of respondents believe that these terms refer to fighting between the Polish and Ukrainian underground, which led to killings of civilians of both nationalities. This view was expressed by 30% of respondents. Another 13% see the events as a defence of the Ukrainians against the actions of the Polish underground forces, and 10% view them as mutual killings.

An increasing percentage of respondents attribute blame to both sides or believe that Poland was more culpable.

As in 2023, one in five respondents recognises that Ukrainians were more culpable: 11% believe it was a crime committed by some UPA units acting against the orders of their commanders, and 7% think it was a case of ethnic cleansing.


↓ QUESTION:

Historians have different opinions about what the ‘Volhynian Tragedy’ or the ‘Volhynia Massacre’ was. What was it in your opinion?


- Mutual warfare between the Polish and Ukrainian underground units, victimising Polish and Ukrainian civilians




- Warfare of Polish underground forces against Ukrainians, where Ukrainians had to defend themselves




- Murders of Polish residents of Volhynia and Galicia, carried out by some units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) against the orders of the UPA commanders



- Mutual murders of Polish and Ukrainian peasants



- Ethnic cleansing against the Poles carried out under the orders of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) commanders



- Not sure



In Right-Bank Ukraine, a relatively highest number of respondents favoured the interpretations pointing to mutual blame. In comparison with other respondents, Galicia featured much higher percentage of those pointing to the culpability of Poles, whereas respondents from regions

other than Galicia or Right-Bank Ukraine were more likely to point to UPA's guilt, perhaps due to the stronger impact of Russian narratives condemning the activities of this military formation.

↓ QUESTION:

Historians have different opinions about what the 'Volhynian Tragedy' or the 'Volhynia Massacre' was. What was it in your opinion?

Breakdown by region.

- Mutual warfare between the Polish and Ukrainian underground units, victimising Polish and Ukrainian civilians



- Warfare of Polish underground forces against Ukrainians, where Ukrainians had to defend themselves



- Murders of Polish residents of Volhynia and Galicia, carried out by some units of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) against the orders of the UPA commanders



- Mutual murders of Polish and Ukrainian peasants



- Ethnic cleansing against the Poles carried out under the orders of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)



Not sure



A relative majority of Ukrainians believe that Polish institutions should be permitted to carry out exhumations only after the Polish authorities have restored the plaque on the grave of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army members in Monastyrz to its previous form (40%). Nevertheless, 33% disagree with this position and believe that permits should

be granted unconditionally and that this issue should be separated from the dispute over the plaque. The latter opinion is least common in Galicia, whereas the views expressed by inhabitants of other regions are nearly evenly split, with a slight prevalence of views favouring restoration of the plaque.

↓ QUESTION:

Ukraine has withheld the issuance of permits to Polish institutions to carry out search and exhumation to bury Poles murdered in Volhynia and Galicia during World War II because a plaque on a grave of UPA members was destroyed in Poland. The plaque was reconstructed, but, against the previous agreement, without a list of the names of those buried there and without the inscription ‘Fallen for a free Ukraine’. Now in Poland it is being said that Ukraine should not be admitted to the EU if it does not allow the exhumation of fallen Poles again. What do you think Ukraine should do? Breakdown by region.

- Resume the issuance of permits to Polish institutions and separate this issue from the dispute over the content of the plaque in Poland



- Resume the issuance of permits only after the previous content of the plaque on the grave of UPA fighters has been restored









• Issue no permits at all




• Not sure




Notes






This report presents the results of a public opinion survey conducted in Ukraine on attitudes towards Poland and Poles. The study was commissioned by the Mioszowski Centre and carried out in the first half of November 2024 by the Info Sapiens sociological research centre. Some of the questions had already been asked to Ukrainian respondents in earlier surveys conducted by the same research provider for the Mioszowski Centre: in August 2022 and October 2023. As a result, we can trace whether or not any significant changes have occurred in the perception of Poland over time and, if so, to identify their nature.



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